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DEFINING THE BAT-rLEFIELD
I. INTRODUCTION
The English language and traditional military discourse contain numerous
terms to describe wartime areas. A battlefield is "a place where a battle is
fought"; a combat area is a military area where combat forces operate.' A
theater of operations is a region in which active combat operations are in
progress, and a theater of war refers to "the entire land, sea, and air area that
is or may become involved directly in war operations., 2 These common
terms provide generally clear descriptions of physical areas during traditional
armed conflicts. United States Civil War enthusiasts thus visit battlefields at
Antietam, Gettysburg, Chancellorsville, and elsewhere. World War II
historians have the beaches at Normandy. We can identify the major battles
of the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, and even Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Moreover, with the exception of the second Gulf War, we can also
identify-often to the day-when each of these conflicts began and ended.
We cannot say the same for the current struggle against terrorism, often
called the "global war on terror." Many contemporary conflicts, in which
states fight against non-state actors and terrorist groups unbounded by
sovereign territorial boundaries and preferring tactics aimed at civilians often
far from any traditionally understood battlefield,3 can easily confound
attempts to use these existing terms effectively. In particular, the present
conflict between the United States and al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist
groups poses significant yet seemingly fundamental questions about not only
the law applicable to operations against terrorists but also about where the
conflict is taking place and where that law applies. Beyond the obvious
areas of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the border areas of Pakistan, there is, at
present, little agreement on where the battlefield is-i.e., where this conflict
1 Battlefield Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
battlefield (last visited Nov. 20, 2010); see JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-02,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 64 (2001),
available at http://www.dtic.mildoctrine/new_pubs/pl 02.pdf (defining "combat zone" as
"[tIhat area required by combat forces for the conduct of operations").
Theater of Operations Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/theater/o20ofO/o20operations (last visited Nov. 20, 2010); Theater of War
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/theater+of+war
(last visited Nov. 20, 2010). See also INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUG 1949, at
617 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter PROTOCOL COMMENTARY] (stating that the
"zone of military operations" is "the territory where the armed forces of the adverse Parties
taking a direct or an indirect part in current military operations, are located").
3 See Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Operationalizing
the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARv. NAT'L SEC. J. 45, 53 (2010) (describing
"new warfare" as "conflicts generally involv[ing] a state engaged in combat with non-state
forces, combat characterized by fighting in highly populated areas with a blurring of the lines
between military forces and civilian persons and objects").
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is taking place-and an equal measure of uncertainty regarding when it
started and how it might end. "A war against groups of transnational
terrorists, by its very nature, lacks a well-delineated timeline or a traditional
battlefield context .. .."4 In addition to the clear political challenges these
uncertainties produce, they also lead to complex legal conundrums regarding
the application of the law to military and counterterrorism operations.
The nature of today's conflicts has thus led many practitioners and
scholars to suggest that the traditional battlefield-once populated by tank
battles and infantry-has been replaced by a more complex environment-
sometimes called the zone of combat.5 A manifestation of the blending of
armed conflict and operational counterterrorism, the zone of combat has been
characterized as broadly as anywhere terrorist attacks are taking place, or
perhaps even being planned and financed.6 Even when not defined as
broadly, the zone of combat encompasses areas beyond the traditional
battlefield and could likely include any area where military responses to
terrorists and terrorist attacks take place. As a result, it is a non-static
environment, making its identification and definition significantly more
challenging.
In an age of conflict where new terminologies abound, the "zone of
combat" may seem to be simply another descriptive term that offers a clearer
representation of real life than its antecedent. Today's conflicts are not
fought out in the open with artillery batteries and scores of infantrymen lined
up in trenches. Rather, when soldiers fight in densely populated urban
environments, drones track suspected terrorists across borders, and terrorists
attempt to detonate bombs in subways, major tourist destinations, and other
civilian locales, the battlefield does indeed seem to be a term from days gone
by. In a purely descriptive sense, therefore, "zone of combat" may well have
great value.
Like many other now-common terms, however, such as enemy
combatant, the concept of the "zone of combat" also raises important and
interesting legal questions. The Bush administration argued that "the
battlefield in the global war on terror extends to every comer of the US
itself' 7-- including locations where suspected al Qaeda sleeper agents were
4 Natasha Balendra, Defining Armed Conflict, 29 CARDozO L. REV. 2461, 2467 (2008).
See also Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the
Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 677 (2004) (noting that
as the boundaries of warfare continue to expand, the spatial and temporal boundaries of armed
conflict break down).
5 Amos N. Guiora, Military Commissions and National Security Courts After
Guantanamo, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 199, 200 (2008).
6 1d.
7 Warren Richey, Appeals Court Weighs Who's an Enemy Combatant, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Oct. 31, 2007), http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/103 1/p02s01-usju.html
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awaiting instructions but not yet carrying out attacks. Interestingly, although
the courts in response have generally accepted the concept of an enemy
combatant and detention related to that status, they have taken a limited view
of the zone of combat in the present struggle.
8
In cases regarding detainees at Guantanamo Bay or the Bagram Theater
Internment Facility at Bagram Airfield and others arrested in the U.S., the
courts have consistently referred to the U.S. as "outside a zone of combat,"9
"distant from a zone of combat,"10 or not within any "active [or formal]
theater of war,"'" even while recognizing the novel geographic nature of the
conflict. As one court noted, comparing the arrest of Yaser Hamdi-
captured after a firefight in Afghanistan-to Jose Padilla-captured upon
disembarking a plane at Chicago's O'Hare airport-would be akin to
comparing apples and oranges, showing that the court saw a distinct
difference between the characterization of the U.S. and that of Afghanistan.
12
Even more recently, in Al Maqaleh v. Gates, both the D.C. District Court and
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit distinguished between Afghanistan,
"a theater of active military combat,"13 and other areas outside Afghanistan
(including the U.S.), which are described as "far removed from any
battlefield. 14
Much has been and will continue to be written about the acceptable
responses to terrorist attacks, the appropriate law to be applied to persons
within the combat zone and/or suspected of involvement in such attacks, and
related issues. One threshold set of questions involves the very nature of the
struggle against terrorism, whether in the form of al Qaeda or other groups-
it could be a law enforcement action, an armed conflict, a hybrid of the two,
or perhaps even something else entirely. 5 Scholars and practitioners will
(describing the government's argument in a brief submitted in the case of Ali Saleh al-Marri
before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals).
8 In assessing if a particular detainee is an enemy combatant, courts consider the location
of his capture or his activities as one consideration, thus tentatively touching on the
parameters of the zone of combat.
9 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 698 (2d Cir. 2003).
10 Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1064 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,770 (2008).
12 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi IV), 337 F.3d 335, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (denial of
rehearing en banc) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) ("[T]o compare this battlefield capture to the
domestic arrest in Padilla v. Rumsfeld is to compare apples and oranges.").
13 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
14 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 229 (D.D.C. 2009) (emphasis added) (holding
that individuals captured in Afghanistan and detained at the Bagram Theater Internment
Facility are not entitled to habeas corpus and specifically distinguishing between detained
battlefield enemy belligerents and individuals apprehended outside the zone of combat
operations).
15 See, e.g., Andreas Paulus & Mindia Vashakmadze, Asymmetrical War and the Notion of
Armed Conflict - A Tentative Conceptualization, 91 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 95 (2009), available
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continue to debate these questions for quite some time, given the complexity
of both the facts on the ground and the interaction of the relevant legal
regimes.
This Article will focus on a related question, but one that has not yet been
asked: where can we conduct an armed conflict against terrorist groups?
Questions of whether the law of armed,conflict applies to conflicts with al
Qaeda or other terrorist groups are beyond the scope of this Article. Rather,
accepting that the United States views itself as engaged "in an armed conflict
with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces,"'16 this Article
at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-873-paulus-vashakmadze.pdf (analyzing the
application of the law of armed conflict to asymmetrical wars between states and non-state
actors); HELEN DUFFY, THE 'WAR ON TERROR' AND THE FRAMvEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
250-55 (2005) (discussing armed conflicts with terrorist groups, specifically al Qaeda, since the
attacks of September 11, 2011); Silvia Borelli, Casting Light on the Legal Black Hole:
International Law and Detentions Abroad in the "War on Terror," 857 INT'L REV. RED CROSS
39, 45-46 (2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_857 borelli.pdf
(arguing that the "war on terror" cannot in and of itself constitute an armed conflict within the
meaning of the law of war); Mark A. Drumbl, Judging the 11 September Terrorist Attack, 24
HUM. RTS. Q. 323 (2002); Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law:
Challenges from the "War on Terror," 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55 (2003), available at
http://insct.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/insct/uploadedfiles/PDFs/Rona, %20Gabor.Interesting%2OTim
es%20for/o20IHL.2003.pdf (noting that while certain aspects of the "war on terror" do fall
within the category of armed conflict, others do not; such that using the terminology of "war"
does not make automatically make it an armed conflict); Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC],
International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (2003),
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5xrdcc.htm (follow "Full text in
PDF format" hyperlink) (analyzing whether the current fight against terrorism is a war in the
legal sense). In contrast, many argue that the attacks of 9/11 and the conflict with al Qaeda do
constitute an armed conflict. See, e.g., Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28
YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2003) (arguing that the law of war governs the September 11th attacks and
the military operations in response); William Lietzau, Combating Terrorism: The Consequences
of Moving from Law Enforcement to War, in .NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? 31, 36-37 (David
Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005) (discussing that "the need to respond via the
armed conflict model was manifest"); Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of "Armed
Attack" in Article 51 of the UN. Charter, 43 HARv. INT'L L.J. 41 (2002) (suggesting that the
September 11 th attacks constituted an armed attack against the United States); Davis Brown, Use
of Force Against Terrorism After September 1th: State Responsibility, Self-Defense and Other
Responses, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMI'. L. 1 (2003) (arguing that U.S. operations against al
Qaeda and the Taliban were lawful in response to the armed attack on the U.S. on September
11 th); Greg Travalio & John Altenburg, Terrorism, State Responsibility, and the Use of Military
Force, 4 C-I. J. INT'L L. 97, 111 (2003) ("There is no doubt that the United States and others are
engaged in a 'war' against terrorism no less real than many other wars fought in the past.").
Regarding the debate generally, see also MICHAEL W. LEWIS ET AL., THE WAR ON TERROR AND
THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE (2009) (discussing the application of the law of
armed conflict to a range of military operations and concluding that, at a minimum, the conflict
between the U.S. and al Qaeda and other groups constitutes a transnational armed conflict
tri 6gering fundamental principles of the law of war).
Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, The Obama Administration and
International Law, Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of
[Vol. 39:1
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will focus on two hitherto unexamined issues-when and for how long is an
area part of the zone of combat, and how far does this designation extend
geographically. Although questions of applicable law have been central to
legal and policy discussions for the past several years, these issues have
remained below the surface and in the shadows. These questions of where
and when with regard to the zone of combat are critical foundational
questions that bear directly on the applicable law within (and without) the
zone of combat.
Part I sets forth the traditional conception of the battlefield or zone of
combat operations, in both the law of neutrality and the law of armed
conflict. The law of neutrality defines the relationship between states
engaged in armed conflict and those not participating.17 The Law of Armed
Conflict (LOAC) governs the conduct of both states and individuals during
armed conflict and seeks to minimize suffering in war by protecting persons
not participating in hostilities and by restricting the means and methods of
warfare. I8 These frameworks can demonstrate both how these legal regimes
International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139
119.htm. All three branches of the US. government have demonstrated that they view the
situation as an armed conflict. See Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L.
No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (characterizing U.S. operations against al Qaeda and other
groups as an armed conflict); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that the
conflict with al Qaeda is a non-international armed conflict within the definition of Common
Article 3); Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 FED. REG. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) (stating that the 9/11 attacks "created a state
of armed conflict that requires the use of the United States Armed Forces"); U.S. DEP'T OF
DEF., Military Commission Order No. 1: Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of
Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Mar. 21, 2002), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf (similarly characterizing U.S.
operations against al Qaeda and other groups as an armed conflict). See also U.S. Dep't of State,
Reply of the Government of the United States of America to the Report of the Five UNHCR
Special Rapporteurs on Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 4 (Mar. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.asil.org/pdfs/ilib0603212.pdf ("The United States is engaged in a continuing
armed conflict against Al Qaida, the Taliban and other terrorist organizations supporting them,
with troops on the ground in several places engaged in combat operations.").
17 U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT para. 1.42 (2004)
[hereinafter U.K. MANUAL].
18 The law of armed conflict is set forth primarily in the four Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949, and their Additional Protocols: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 50,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC II1]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
GC IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
2010]
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can contribute to useful assessments of the temporal and geographic scope of
the zone of combat and where the traditional parameters fall short.
Part II then examines the nature of the zone of combat in contemporary
conflict and counterterrorism operations to illustrate why the geographic and
temporal scope of the battlefield is a critical issue in such conflicts. Because
the traditional frameworks fall short in delineating the parameters of the zone
of combat, we need to analyze how to better define the temporal and
geographic scope of the conflict. For example, if an al Qaeda member is
walking down the street in Vancouver, Oslo, or Santiago, is that area
necessarily-or not-part of the zone of combat? In Part "II, general
principles of LOAC and concepts drawn from LOAC's analysis of non-
international armed conflict suggest three primary factors to consider in
delineating the zone of combat: the nature of the hostilities, the government
response, and the territorial connections or attachments of the relevant
terrorist group or actors.
Using these factors, this Article proposes parameters for conceptualizing
the zone of combat, drawing on traditional conceptions of the battlefield and
contemporary understandings of armed conflict and operational
counterterrorism. By understanding where and when the relevant legal
constructs are applicable, we will have a better understanding of the
framework within which operational decisions must be made. The policy
implications of different legal approaches play an important role, given the
ramifications that varying parameters of the zone of combat can have for
both national security and individual liberty interests.
II. TRADITIONAL BATTLEFIELD PARAMETERS
Naturally limited-and triggered-by the existence of an armed conflict,
LOAC provides guidance for understanding the temporal and geographic
scope of armed conflict. Indeed, "[t]he laws of war operate within temporal
and geographic realms; considerable attention is given to when it can be said
that an 'armed conflict' has arisen and ended, and also to where it is that
protected persons are located. .,9 The temporal and geographic scope, in
turn, provides parameters for where and when to apply LOAC's rights and
obligations to persons within that area. LOAC thus offers a paradigm for
understanding the parameters of the zone of combat that other legal
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. LOAC is also commonly
called the law of war or international humanitarian law (IHL).
19 Sean D. Murphy, Symposium on the New Face of Armed Conflict: Enemy Combatants
After Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigms in the "War on
Terrorism," 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1150 (2007).
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frameworks-such as human rights law or domestic criminal law-cannot
necessarily offer because they do not have any comparable framework for
determining applicability.
A. Belligerent Territory and Neutral Territory
Although in any international conflict there will be many states that
remain neutral, the nature of an interconnected, globalized world is such that
neutrals cannot simply turn a blind eye to a conflict between two or more
other countries. Neutrality thus signals the dividing line between the
application of the laws of neutrality and the laws of war.2" It thus provides
an uncontestable framework for where and when hostilities can be
conducted-the very questions that remain so difficult to answer in today's
counterterrorism operations and conflicts with non-state actors and terrorist
groups.
Traditionally, states are either belligerents or neutrals during an armed
conflict. As Oppenheim explained, "Such States as do not take part in a war
between other States are neutrals.",21  The law of neutrality "defines the
relationship under international law between states engaged in an armed
conflict and those that are not participating in that armed conflict. 22 Based
on the fundamental principle that neutral territory is inviolable,23 neutrality
law seeks to (1) contain the spread of hostilities, particularly by keeping
down the number of participants; (2) define the legal rights of parties and
nonparties to the conflict; and (3) limit the impact of war on nonparticipants,
20 YORAM DINsTEN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 25 (4th ed. 2005) ("The laws
of neutrality are operative only as long as the neutral State retains its neutral status. Once that
State becomes immersed in the hostilities, the laws of neutrality cease being applicable, and
the laws of warfare take their place. However, if the neutral State is not drawn into the war,
the laws of neutrality are activated from the onset of the war until its conclusion.").
21 L. OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 653 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952).
22 U.K. MANUAL, supra note 17.
23 Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons
in Case of War on Land, art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 1 Bevans 654, 205 Consol. T.S.
299 [hereinafter Hague V]. See also GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 844 (6th rev. ed. 1992) ("The basic right,
beyond any question, is the inviolability of neutral territory. . . [and] all other neutral rights
really are mere corollaries to that fundamental principle .. "); MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE
MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 534 (1959) ("The chief and most vital right of a neutral
state is that of the inviolability of its territory."); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN,
A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 179 (6th ed. 1976) (explaining that the rights and duties
of neutral powers under international customary law can be summarized in three basic rules:
(1) a neutral state must abstain from taking sides in the war and from assisting either
belligerent; (2) a neutral state has the right and duty to prevent its territory from being used by
either belligerent as a base for hostile operations; and (3) a neutral state must acquiesce in
certain restrictions which belligerents are entitled to impose on peaceful intercourse between
its citizens and their enemies, in particular, limitations on the freedom of the seas).
2010]
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24
especially with regard to commerce. Neutrality law thus leads to a
geographic-based framework in which belligerents can fight on belligerent
territory or the commons but must refrain from any operations on neutral
territory. In essence, the battlespace in a traditional armed conflict between
two or more states is anywhere outside the sovereign territory of any of the
neutral states. In a conflict involving many states, such as World War II,
for example, the battlefield--or the areas where states could conduct
hostilities-certainly extended across the globe, but did not include neutral
territory.
The Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land of 1907 (Hague V) sets forth
neutrality law's basic principles.26 Beyond upholding the inviolability of
neutral territory, Hague V prohibits the movement of belligerent troops or
materiel across neutral territory 7 and the use of military installations or
communications facilities on neutral territory.2 8  In addition, belligerent
states may not attack targets in neutral territory, unless, as stated below, the
neutral state fails to ensure its territory is not used for belligerent purposes.2 9
For its part, a neutral power must not provide, or enable the provision of,
military supplies to any belligerent,30 nor allow its territory to be used for
military operations. 31 Indeed, it may use force-as necessary and within its
capability-to prevent belligerent powers from using its territory for war-
making purposes.32 To the extent a neutral state is unable or unwilling to
prevent the use of its territory for such purposes, "a belligerent state may
become entitled to use force in self-defence against enemy forces operating
from the territory of that neutral state, 33 based on the ordinary rules
governing the resort to force.
24 John Astley III & Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of the Sea and Naval Operations, 42
A.F. L. REV. 119, 139 (1997).
25 DINSTEIN, supra note 20, at 26 ("[T]he region of war does not include the territories of
neutral States, and no hostilities are permissible within neutral boundaries.").
26 Hague V, supra note 23. See also Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers in Naval War (Hague Convention XIII), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, 1
Bevans 723, 205 Consol. T.S. 395 (setting forth the principles of neutrality law for conflicts at
sea).
27 Hague V, supra note 23, art. 2.
21 Id. art. 3.
29 U.K. MANUAL, supra note 17, para. 1.43(a).
30 DINSTEIN, supra note 20, at 27.
31 id.
32 Hague V, supra note 23, arts. 5, 10.
33 U.K. MANUAL, supra note 17, para. 1.43(a).
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B. LOAC's Geographic and Temporal Parameters
Beyond the belligerent-neutral paradigm, LOAC provides an alternative
way to identify temporal and spatial boundaries or, at a minimum, to
highlight useful criteria for doing so. Although the Geneva Conventions do
not specifically delineate the geographic boundaries of conflict, both
Common Article 2 and Common Article 3 take a geographic approach in
some way. Common Article 2, which speaks of "all cases of declared war
or ... any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the
High Contracting Parties, ' '34 brings the law of neutrality and the division
between belligerents and neutrals directly into play. In the event of such a
conflict, the theater of war-to use one descriptive term-would be
anywhere the forces of two belligerents come into contact or are otherwise
using force, such as to attack civilians, outside neutral territory. For non-
international armed conflicts, Common Article 3 refers to conflict "occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, 35 suggesting that, at a
minimum, the territory of the state in which the conflict is taking place forms
part of the geographic area of conflict.
The Geneva Conventions do provide some guidance regarding the
temporal scope of armed conflict, referring to the "cessation of active
hostilities 36 and the "general close of military operations., 37  When the
Conventions were drafted, the general close of military operations was
considered to be "when the last shot has been fired. 38 The Commentary to
the Fourth Geneva Convention offers further detail, explaining:
When the struggle takes place between two States the date of
the close of hostilities is fairly easy to decide: it will depend
either on an armistice, a capitulation or simply on debellatio.
On the other hand, when there are several States on one or both
34 GC I, supra note 18, art. 2; GC II, supra note 18, art. 2; GC III, supra note 18, art. 2; GC
IV, supra note 18, art. 2. Collectively, Article 2 of Geneva Conventions I-IV is referred to as
Common Article 2.
35 GC I, supra note 18, art. 3; GC I1, supra note 18, art. 3; GC III, supra note 18, art. 3; GC
IV, supra note 18, art. 3. Collectively, Article 3 of Geneva Conventions I-IV is referred to as
Common Article 3.
36 See GC III, supra note 18, art. 118 (referring to the release and repatriation of prisoners
of war).
37 See GC IV, supra note 18, art. 6 (denoting the end of application of the GC IV in the
territory of parties to the conflict, upon the general close of military operations, or in occupied
territory, one year after the general close of military operations); see also AP I, supra note 18,
art. 3(b) ("[T]he application of the Conventions and of this Protocol shall cease, in the
territory of Parties to the conflict, on the general close of military operations .... ").
38 II-A Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, at 815 (1949),
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/Dipl-Conf- 1949-FinalVol-2-A.pdf.
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of the sides, the question is harder to settle. It must be agreed
that in most cases the general close of military operations will
be the final end of all fighting between all those concerned.39
This approach is based, above all, on a practical understanding of the facts on
the ground and not on the formalities of armistice, peace treaty or other legal
instrument.n One final issue relates to the frequency or sustained nature of
the violence. Although the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) speaks of "protracted armed violence" 41 in defining non-
international armed conflict in Prosecutor v. Tadic, hostilities need not be
continuous to qualify as armed conflict or for LOAC to apply constantly
throughout the conflict.
42
Beyond this limited guidance from the conventions and the
commentaries, we can look to international jurisprudence for some additional
understanding of the geographic and temporal parameters of armed conflict.
39 OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., IV COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO
THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSON IN TIME OF WAR 62 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin &
C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter GC IV COMMENTARY]; see also
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations:
Factors in War to Peace Transitions, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 843, 845-46 (2004)
(arguing that conflict does not necessarily stop when the occupation of a territory is
terminated and that GC IV should apply until there is a "cessation of active hostilities" or
"general close of military operations").
40 For example, the armistice "between France and Germany in 1940 did not represent the
general close of military operations in the sense in which the phrase is used." GC IV
COMMENTARY, supra note 39, at 62 n.3; see also Vaughn A. Ary, Concluding Hostilities:
Humanitarian Provisions in Cease-Fire Agreements, 148 MIL. L. REV. 186, 206 (1995)
(explaining that the "general close of military operations" means the "final end of all fighting
between all those concerned"). In contrast, the end of all fighting between the parties can
constitute the general close of military operations even in the absence of a formal peace treaty.
U.K. MANUAL, supra note 17, para. 3.10 n.25 ("In 1951, the UN Security Council refused to
accept Egypt's claim to be exercising belligerent rights in respect of shipping passing through
the Suez Canal over two years after the 1949 armistice had put an end to the full-scale
hostilities between Israel and Egypt.").
41 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995).
42 Andreas Zimmerman, Preliminary Remarks on Para. 2(c)-( and Para. 3: War Crimes
Committed in an Armed Conflict Not of an International Character, in COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 262, 285 (Otto Tiffterer ed., 1999)
[hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE] ("The term 'protracted' seems to imply a
certain time element, which as far as article 1 of the Second Add. Prot. is concerned, is
contained in the term 'sustained.' However, it has to be noted that, unlike a case of sustained
armed violence, the operations need not be kept continuously going by the conflicting Parties.
This is confirmed by the French version, which unlike the French version of article 1 para. 1
of the Second Add. Prot., does not refer to military actions which can be qualified as being
'opdrations continues' but simply to the fact that the armed conflicts between the different
parties must take place 'de maniere prolongge.' ").
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In Tadic, the ICTY stated that LOAC mandates a broad geographic and
temporal scope for armed conflict.43 Referring to various provisions in the
Geneva Conventions demonstrating that their protections extend beyond the
actual fighting, the Tadic Appeals Chamber declared that in both internal and
international armed conflicts, the temporal and geographic limits range
beyond the exact time and place of hostilities.44 The Tribunal held that:
[i]nternational humanitarian law applies from the initiation
of... armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of
hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in
the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved.
Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to
apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case
of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a
party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.45
As the Tribunal's examination of relevant provisions in the Geneva
Conventions demonstrates, the purpose of such a broad scope is to ensure the
maximum protection for all persons engaged in or caught up in the conflict.
As an example, Common Article 3 refers to persons "taking no active part
in the hostilities,"" including members of armed forces who have laid down
their arms and those who are hors de combat, suggesting that the protections
in that article must apply outside the limited locations of actual combat
operations.47 Provisions in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions
relating to the protection of prisoners of war and civilians, respectively,
demonstrate that the law applies anywhere within the territory of the parties
to the conflict, not simply where hostilities are taking place.48  Similarly,
Article 5 of the First Geneva Convention provides that "[flor the protected
persons who have fallen into the hands of the enemy, the present Convention
43 Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 69.
44id.
41 Id. para. 70.
46 GC I, supra note 18, art. 3; GC II, supra note 18, art. 3; GC III, supra note 18, art. 3; GC
IV, supra note 18, art. 3.
47 GC 1, supra note 18, art. 3; GC II, supra note 18, art. 3; GC III, supra note 18, art. 3; GC
IV, supra note 18, art. 3.
48 See, e.g., GC III, supra note 18, art. 19 (requiring POWs to be evacuated out of the
combat zone; it is important to note that all the protections of the Conventions still apply to
POWs outside the combat zone); GC IV, supra note 18, art. 13 (noting that the provisions of
Part II of the Fourth Geneva Convention "cover the whole of the populations of the countries
in conflict").
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shall apply until their final repatriation."49  These protections mandate a
broad temporal scope as well to ensure that such persons are protected
whenever they are in the hands of the enemy party, not just during combat
operations. Thus, there need not be actual fighting taking place at all times
in every area for such areas to be part of the conflict.50 The next step then is
to examine whether this framework can help in determining the boundaries
of the zone of combat in today's conflicts.
III. APPLYING GEOGRAPHIC AND TEMPORAL PARAMETERS TO
CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS
This Article's central question-where is the battlefield in the conflict
with terrorists and how long does it remain the battlefield-is a fundamental
and critical component of understanding the parameters of state action in
combating terrorism. In traditional conflicts, military operations could take
place beyond the territory of any neutral party. 5 Today's conflicts, however,
pit states against non-state entities; actors and groups who often do not have
any territorial nexus beyond wherever they can find safe haven from
government intrusion. As state and non-state actors
have often shifted unpredictably and irregularly between acts
characteristic of wartime and those characteristic of not-
wartime[, t]he unpredictable and irregular nature of these shifts
makes it difficult to know whether at any given moment one
should understand them as armies and their enemies or as
police forces and their criminal adversaries.5 2
Once we are outside the traditional belligerent-neutral framework that
defined the traditional battlespace, determining the parameters of the
contemporary battlefield or zone of combat becomes significantly more
complicated. In addition, while human rights law-applicable in peacetime
or wartime-treats the use of force in response to a threat as a measure of
49 GC I, supra note 18, art. 5; see also Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 67 ("[B]oth
Conventions I and III apply until protected persons who have fallen into the power of the
enemy have been released and repatriated.").
50 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 185 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Nov. 16, 1998).
51 D1NSTEIN, supra note 20, at 20 ("In principle, all the territories of the belligerent States,
anywhere under their sovereign sway, are inside the region of war. As a corollary, the region
of war does not overstep the boundaries of neutral States, and no hostilities are permitted
within their respective domains.").
52 Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal
Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 7 (2004).
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last resort, 53 LOAC contemplates-indeed authorizes-the use of force as a
first resort against legitimate targets.54 Thus, above all else, when leaders
invoke the battlefield or the zone of combat, they seek to harness the
authority to use force as a first resort against those identified as the enemy
(terrorists, insurgents, etc.). For this reason alone, it is critical to understand
both the parameters of the zone of combat and the ramifications of
identifying particular areas as falling within that zone of combat.
A. Contemporary Combat Scenarios: Describing the Zone of Combat
At present, the overwhelming proportion of U.S. military forces are
deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq and almost all actual combat operations are
taking place in those two locales. There is little doubt that Afghanistan and
Iraq form part of the zone of combat and a corresponding recognition that the
entire territory of each country forms part of that zone of combat.55 The
"global war on terror" is not limited to Afghanistan and Iraq, however.
Identifying when other areas become a zone of combat-or form part of a
broader zone of combat-as a result of terrorist attacks or subsequent
military operations proves challenging and has significant legal and policy
ramifications.
1. Terrorist Activities and Attacks
A look at major terrorist attacks in the past nine years shows a wide
geographic scope and an obvious focus on major metropolitan areas where
civilian casualties, and therefore impact, are maximized. Europe, Africa,
Asia-the attacks span the globe and, for many, lend credence to the label
"global war on terror." Among countless others in a range of countries, the
53 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Israel, 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003), available at http://
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/CCPR.CO.78.ISR.En?OpenDocument ("Before
resorting to the use of deadly force, all measures to arrest a person suspected of being in the
process of committing acts of terror must be exhausted."); Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann,
Law and Policy of Targeted Killing, 1 HARv. NAT'L SEC. J. 145, 160-61 (2010) ("Domestic
law enforcement operations permit shooting to kill a suspected criminal only under very
limited circumstances."); Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report on Terrorism and Human Rights,
OEA/Ser.L/V/1I. 116 doc. 5 rev. I corr. 87 (2002), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Ter
rorism/Eng/exe.htm ("[Although] the state has the right and obligation to protect the
population against [threats of violence] and in so doing may use lethal force in certain
situations," the use of force is strictly proscribed.).
54 Geoffrey S. Corn, Anniversary Contributions: Use of Force: Back to the Future: De
Facto Hostilities, Transnational Terrorism, and the Purpose of the Law of Armed Conflict, 30
U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1345, 1353 (2009).
55 Balendra, supra note 4, at 2467, 2502.
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following are some of the major attacks in the past decade. On October 12,
2002, an Indonesian terrorist group bombed a Bali discotheque popular with
Western tourists, killing over 200 people.56 The March 2004 Madrid train
bombing killed 191 people and wounded nearly two thousand, the worst
terror attack on European soil since the 1988 Lockerbie bombing. On July
7, 2005, three suicide bombers hit the London subway and a bomb exploded
on a double-decker bus, killing fifty-two and wounding more than seven
hundred.58 Mumbai has been the site of two horrific attacks in the past four
years, starting with the July 2006 bombings of the Suburban Railway that
killed 209 and wounded more than seven hundred.5 9 Two years later, armed
gunmen opened fire at eight sites in a coordinated attack, including a train
station, Western hotels, a hospital, a Chabad house, restaurants, and a police
station.
60
Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups-working alone or in concert,
affiliated or independent-have also attempted attacks on U.S. soil or on
aircraft traveling to the U.S. In December 2001, Richard Reid, now known
as the shoe bomber, tried to detonate an explosive in his shoe on an
American Airlines flight from the United Kingdom to Boston.61 A few years
later, in August 2006, authorities in the United Kingdom arrested eight men
plotting to use liquid explosives to blow up seven airliners en route from
London's Heathrow Airport to the United States.62 Finally, on Christmas
Day 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate explosives on
a Northwest Airlines flight to Detroit.63 U.S. authorities have disrupted and
foiled numerous other plots within the United States as well and some
attempted attacks have simply failed. Most recently, Faisal Shahzad tried to
56 Raymond Bonner, Bombing at Resort in Indonesia Kills 150 and Hurts Scores More, N.Y.
TIMES (ABSTRACTS), Oct. 13, 2002, at 11, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/13/world/bombing-at-
resort-in-indonesia-kills-150-and-hurts-scores-more.html; Bali Bombing Victims Remembered,
BBC NEWS, Oct. 12, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3735506.strm
17 Madrid Train Attacks, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/
457031/html.
58 London Attacks, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in depth/uk/2005/london explos
ions/default.stm.
59 Scores Dead in Mumbai Train Bombs, BBC NEWS (July 11, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/5169332.stm.
60 Mumbai Rocked by Deadly Attacks, BBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/7751160.stm.
61 Thomas B. Edsall, Passenger Subdued on Plane; Bomb Fears Prompt Incident Over
Atlantic, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2001, at Al; Derek Rose & Corky Siemaszko, Shoe Bomber
Gets Kicked in the Can, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 31, 2003, at 5.
62 Mark Rice-Oxley, Foiled Terror Plot on Scale of 9/11, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug.
11, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/081 1/pO1 sO2-woeu.html.
63 Josh Meyer, Al Qaeda Link Probed in Jet Incident: Nigerian Man Charged With Trying
to Blow Up Plane, BALT. SUN, Dec. 27, 2009, at 14A; David Shepardson & Catherine Jun,
Terror Attack Fails on Flight to Detroit, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 26, 2009, at Al.
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detonate a car bomb in Times Square in New York City on May 1, 2010.64
Shahzad was subsequently arrested as he tried to leave the country two days
later and pleaded guilty in June 2010.65 Other attempts include Jose Padilla's
dirty bomb, the planned attack on the New York City tunnels, and newly
revealed plots for twin transit attacks in New York and London.66
In recent years, al Qaeda has begun to retreat from Afghanistan and has
regrouped and reorganized in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and
Swat Valley. It has also formed offshoots in Iraq, known as al Qaeda in
Mesopotamia, largely ousted by U.S. and allied forces.67 Outside these
areas, however, reports suggest that al Qaeda operates and finds sanctuary in
a variety of other countries, in particular Yemen, Somalia and the
Philippines.68  Al Qaeda has long recruited in or drawn adherents from
Yemen and, in recent years, "a resurgent Yemen-based al Qaeda wing that
has been trying to strengthen its foothold in the Arabian peninsula state" has
made its home in Maarib Province. 69 By 2009, al Qaeda leaders from Saudi
Arabia had merged with existing al Qaeda forces in Yemen to form Al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula, in essence creating a regional franchise.7 °
Al Qaeda's influence and foothold in Somalia have grown since
Ethiopia's invasion to overthrow the Islamic Courts Union and install the
Transitional Federal Government.71 "Foreign fighters trained in Afghanistan
64 Al Baker & William K. Rashbaum, Police Find Car Bomb in Times Square, N.Y. TIMES (May
1, 2010), http://www.nyfimes.com/2010/05/02/nyregion/02timessquare.html; Alison Gendar et al.,
Faisal Shahzad, Times Sq. Bomb Suspect, Nabbed Within 'Minutes' of Escape; 2 Held in Pakistan,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 4, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/nylocal/2010/05/04/2010-05-04
times square bombplot suspect faisal shahzad says he acted alone traced by cell.html.
65 Tina Susman, Guilty Plea in NYC Bomb Plot; "Muslim Soldier" Shahzad Predicts More
U.S. Attacks, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 2010, at 10.
66 Tom Hays & Matt Apuzzo, Al Qaeda Planned Twin Transit Attacks in US and Britain;
New Indictment Adds Key Suspect to N.Y Bomb Plot, Bos. GLOBE, July 8, 2010, at 7.
67 See Jim Landers, Al-Qaeda Ousted in Parts of Iraq, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 23,
2008 (stating that U.S. and Iraqi forces have ousted al Qaeda out of many parts of Iraq).
68 See Eric Schmitt & David E. Sanger, Some with Qaeda Leave Pakistan for New Havens,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/world/
12terror.html (stating that groups of al Qaeda leaders have moved from Pakistan to Yemen
and Somalia).
69 Mohamed Sudam, Yemen Army Clashes with Tribesmen, Hunts al Qaeda, REUTERS (June 9,
2010), http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/06/09/idINIndia-49167420100609; Schmitt & Sanger,
supra note 68; Yemen al-Qaeda Mediator Killed in Air Strike, BBC NEWS (May 25, 2010), http:/
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/middle east/101 53486.stm.
70 Julie Cohn, Islamic Radicalism in Yemen, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 29, 2010),
httR://www.cfr.org/publication!9369/islamist radicalism inyemen.html.
Julie Cohn, Terrorism Havens: Somalia, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 2010), http://
www.cfr.org/publication/9366/terrorismhavens.html; see also INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP,
COUNTER-TERRORISM IN SOMALIA: LOSING HEARTS AND MINDS? 8-9 (2005), available at http://
www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/files/africa/hom-of-africa/somalia/cunter-terrorism%20in%2Oso
malia%201osing/o20hearts%20and%20minds.ashx (detailing al Qaeda's Somalia cell).
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are gaining influence inside Somalia's al-Shabab militia, fueling a radical
Islamist insurgency with ties to Osama bin Laden, according to Somali
intelligence officials, former al-Shabab fighters and analysts. 72 Finally, al
Qaeda has long had a presence in the Philippines, although more as a
facilitator for the local insurgent groups, Jemaah Islamiyah and the Abu
Sayyaf Group, than as an operator. 3
2. U.S. Use of Military Force Outside of Afghanistan and Iraq
For the past few years, the U.S. has engaged in target-specific drone air
strikes against Taliban militants in Pakistan. A large proportion of these
drone strikes target leaders and members of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, an
umbrella group of what were once locally oriented tribal militias involved in
separate conflicts with the state of Pakistan.74 For its part, Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan has attacked NATO convoys passing through Pakistan and killed
U.S. military advisors in attacks inside Pakistan.75 It launched a "fedayeen
style" attack on the U.S. consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan involving both car
bombs and an assault team armed with rocket launchers and automatic
72 Sudarsan Raghavan, Foreign Fighters Gain Influence in Somalia's Islamist al-Shabab
Militia, WASH. POST, June 8, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/cont
ent/article/2010/06/07/AR2010060704667.html.
73 Preeti Bhattacharji, Terrorism Havens: Philippines, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 1,
2009), http://www.cfr.org/philippines/terrorism-havens-philippines/p9365; Raymond Bonner,
Philippine Camps Are Training Al Qaeda's Allies, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2003,
at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/31/world/threats-responses-southeast-as
ia-philippine-camps-are-training-al-qaeda-s-allies.html.
4 BRIAN FISHMAN, THE BATTLE FOR PAKISTAN: MILITARY AND CONFLICT ACROSS THE
FATA AND NWFP 6, 10 (2010), available at http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/ne
wamerica.net/files/policydocs/fishman.pdf.
75 Robert Fisk, Shadow Lands: Pakistan - A Nation Under Attack, INDEP. (U.K.), Apr. 6,
2010, at 2, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/shadow-lands-pakistan
-a-nation-under-attack-1936507.html; Chris Brumnuitt, US Steps Up Missile Attacks in
Pakistan, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/14/us-ste
ps-up-drone-attacks n_423066.htrnl; Asif Shahzad, Blast Kills 16 Cadets in Pakistan; NATO
Trucks Hit in Separate Attack, Bos. GLOBE, Aug. 31, 2009, at 4, available at http://www.boston.
com/news/world/asia/articles/2009/08/3 1/bombingjkills16 cadets_inpakistan/ ("Bombings
targeted a Pakistani police station and set a NATO fuel convoy ablaze yesterday .. "); 60
Minutes: War in Pakistan (CBS television broadcast May 31, 2009) (describing TTP attacks
destroying hundreds of American and NATO vehicles); Pakistan Fighters Torch Afghan Supply
Truck, AL ARABIVA, Mar. 14, 2009 (describing a TTP attack with automatic weapons and rocket
propelled grenades on a NATO supply convoy resulting in the firing of twenty supply trucks);
Mansoor Khan, 3 Hurt as NATO Convoy Ambushed in Karachi, NATION (PAK.), Jan. 28, 2010;
Jane Perlez, 100 Trucks of Supplies Destroyed in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2008, at A6;
Shahan Mufti, Taliban Hiacking Threatens Key NA TO Supply Route, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Nov. 12, 2008, at 25.
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weapons and likely participated in the suicide bomb attack on Forward
Operating Base Chapman that killed seven CIA employees.76
The U.S. launched what is believed to be its first drone attack inside
Pakistan in 2004, targeting and killing Nek Muhammad, the South
Waziristan tribal leader." The U.S. then launched a total of nine drone
strikes in Pakistan through the end of 2007.78 Beginning in 2008, the U.S.
dramatically increased its use of drones in Pakistan, launching thirty-four
attacks and killing over one hundred militants.79 In 2009, the U.S. launched
fifty-three strikes-a rate of one drone strike per week-and more than
double that number in 2010.80
Since 2001, the U.S. has also targeted al Qaeda leaders and other
terrorists in other countries on multiple occasions. Given al Qaeda's
penchant for seeking sanctuary in Yemen, that country has been a frequent
locale of such attacks, including the first use of an armed drone outside
Afghanistan after September 11 th.8' In that attack, a CIA drone launched a
Hellfire missile and killed six suspected al Qaeda members traveling in a car
in southern Yemen, including the man believed responsible for the bombing
of the U.S.S. Cole.82 More recently, the U.S. has deployed drones to target
Anwar al-Aulaqi, the al Qaeda terrorist suspected of planning the failed
attack against Britain's ambassador to Yemen in April and allegedly
involved in the Fort Hood shooting incident and the Christmas Day bomber's
attempted attack.
83
76 Roy Gutman & Saeed Shah, Taliban Chief Tied to CIA Bombing Believed Dead; West
Confident Despite Denials of Militant Group, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 1, 2010, at A6.
77 David Rohde & Mohammed Khan, The Reach of War: Militants; Ex - Fighter for
Taliban Dies in Strike in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2004, at A6.
78 PETER BERGEN & KATHERINE TIEDEMANN, THE YEAR OF THE DRONE: AN ANALYSIS OF
U.S. DRONE STRIKES IN PAKISTAN, 2004-2010, at 3 (2010), available at http://counterterroris
m.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/bergentiedemann2.pdf (listing nine
strikes from 2004 to 2007 in the table labeled "Number of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan").
79 id.
80 Id.; 2010: The Year of the Drone, NEW AM. FOUND., http://counterterrorism.newamerica.
net/drones/2010 (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
81 Sources: U.S. Kills Cole Suspect, CNN, Nov. 4, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WO
RLD/meast/1 1/04/yemen.blast/index.html; see also Philip Alston, U.N. Human Rights Council,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 47, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hr
council/docs/14session/A.HRC. 14.24.Add6.pdf.
82 Sources: U.S. Kills Cole Suspect, supra note 81.
83 Con Coughlin & Philip Sherwell, American Drones Deployed to Target Yemeni Terrorist,
TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (May 2, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yem
en/7663661/American-drones-deployed-to-target-Yemeni-terrorist.html. Anwar Awlaki, as refer
-enced in the article, is an alternate spelling for Anwar al-Aulaqi.
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In Somalia, as early as 2007, the U.S. launched attacks against al Qaeda
members suspected of involvement in the 1998 Embassy bombings.84 After
multiple attempts to target Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, the al Qaeda militant
suspected of masterminding the 2002 attack on the Paradise Hotel in
Mombasa, Kenya, the United States launched a commando raid in broad
daylight, killing Nabhan and at least eight others. Finally, in an attack
related to the war in Iraq, U.S. Special Forces killed eight so-called foreign
fighters in Syria in October 2008.86
B. Traditional LOA C Frameworks and Today's Conflicts
Contemporary conflicts pitting states against terrorist groups, as in the
situations described above, significantly challenge traditional frameworks for
understanding the parameters of the zone of combat. Simply superimposing
the approach applicable in traditional armed conflict onto conflicts with
terrorist groups does not provide any means for distinguishing between
different conceptions of the battlefield. Just a few weeks after the September
11 th attacks, President George W. Bush laid the foundation for the notion of
the whole world as a battlefield when he pronounced that " '[o]ur war on
terror will be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the past.
The war will be fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or plan.' ,81 When
coupled with statements by other high-ranking administration officials, 88 the
President's view of a global battlefield, in which the whole world is a war
zone, became clear. U.S. resort to military force in numerous countries
84 See US 'Targets al-Qaeda' in Somalia, BBC, Jan. 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/afr
ica/6245943.stm ("White House spokesman Tony Snow said the US action was a reminder
that there was no safe haven for Islamic militants. 'This administration continues to go after
al-Qaeda,' he said.").
8 Jeffrey Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Kills Top Qaeda Militant in Southern Somalia,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/15/world/
africa/15raid.html; Jeffrey Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, US. Forces Fire Missiles into Somalia
at a Kenyan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at A9.
86 Ian Black & Ewen MacAskill, US Forces Kill Eight in Helicopter Raid on Syria,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 27, 2008, at 15, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/
oct/27/syria-helicopter-attack.
87 Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 1 (2004), available at
htt://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59524/kenneth-roth/the-law-of-war-in-the-war-on-terror.
8 See, e.g., Condoleeza Rice on Fox News Sunday (Fox News broadcast Nov. 11, 2002),
available at http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendly story/0,3566,69783,00.htrnl (featuring
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice explaining, "We're in a new kind of war, and we've made
very clear that it is important that this new kind of war be fought on different battlefields.");
Matthew C. Waxman, The Structure of Terrorism Threats and the Laws of War, 20 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 429, 442 (2010) (noting that this view " 'extend[s] the boundaries of the
conflict to take in al-Qaeda's operations around the world' " (citing Anthony Dworkin,
Beyond the "War on Terror": Towards a New Transatlantic Framework for
Counterterrorism, 13 EUR. COUlCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 1, 5 (2009)).
[Vol. 39:1
DEFINING THE BATFLEFIELD
around the world has borne out this theory over the past nine years since the
September 11 th attacks. Indeed, in 2004, then-Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld signed a secret order giving the U.S. military authority to strike at
al Qaeda targets anywhere in the world. 9 In such a global war, the
battlefield knows no geographic or temporal boundaries, and the U.S. would
be entitled to kill its enemies wherever and whenever it finds them.90
The primary counter to this notion of a global battlefield is founded on
traditional conceptions of armed conflict, according to which "[a]rmed
conflicts inevitably have a limited and identifiable territorial or spatial
dimension because human beings who participate in armed conflict require
territory in which to carry out intense, protracted, armed exchanges." 91 As
the discussion of the law of neutrality above demonstrates, spatial is a more
accurate description than territorial, because territory is only one component
of where combat operations take place. Proponents of this limited
conception of the battlefield argue that terrorist attacks do not constitute
protracted exchanges-one element necessary to finding the existence of a
non-international armed conflict-and therefore action against terrorists,
even targeted strikes with military force, do not create a combat zone or
battlefield. Thus, while the U.S. may be engaged in an armed conflict with
al Qaeda, these scholars believe that such conflict only takes place in limited,
defined geographic areas-areas that would thus constitute the battlefield or
zone of combat-such as Afghanistan, Iraq and the border areas of
92Pakistan. However, without any explanation beyond these conclusory
statements regarding why the conflict, and thus the zone of combat, is
limited to these geographic areas, this view offers no more justified
conception of the zone of combat than the global battlefield theory.
89 Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, Order Lets U.S. Strike Al Qaeda Worldwide, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Nov. 11, 2008, at 1.
90 Adam Entous, Special Report: How the White House Learned to Love the Drone,
REUTERS (U.S.) (May 18, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/18/us-pakistan-dron
es-idUSTRE64H5SL20100518 ("The battlefield in the 'war on terror' is global and not
restricted to a particular nation.... This is war and we are entitled to kill them anywhere we
find them." (quoting a former legal advisor to the U.S. Army Special Forces)); Blum &
He 'mann, supra note 53, at 156.
9 Mary Ellen O'Connell, Combatants and the Combat Zone, 43 U. RICH. L. REv. 845, 858
(2009).
Rise of the Drones 11: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting, Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Government Reform, 111 th Cong. 2d Sess. 3-4 (2010) (statement of Mary Ellen O'Connell,
Professor, Notre Dame Law School). But see Rise of the Drones 11: Examining the Legality of
Unmanned Targeting, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on National Security and Foreign Affairs
of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. 2d Sess. 4-5 (2010)
(statement of Michael W. Lewis, Professor, Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law)
[hereinafter Lewis, Rise of the Drones II] (discussing the argument for a limited geographic
scope to the battlefield in the conflict with al Qaeda).
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U.S. practice, where decisions to use force are based on belligerent status
or conduct rather than any adherence to geographic or spatial concepts, does
indeed compel the conclusion that the U.S. views the whole world as a
battlefield. And yet, at the same time, the U.S. also seems to view certain
areas as outside the scope of appropriate belligerent activity, most likely
based on a conception of what the host nation can or will do to address a
particular threat. The co-existence of these two themes suggests that
delineating the lines between battlefield and non-battlefield is based more on
arbitrary decision-making than on a process stemming from traditional law-
based conceptions of the theater of hostilities.
The temporal scope of the conflict with al Qaeda is equally, if not more,
perplexing. Terrorism is a phenomenon, not an enemy party; it is thus more
likely to be managed over time than defeated outright.93 Terrorist groups
morph, splinter, and reconfigure, making it difficult to determine if, let alone
when, they have been defeated. Even though some U.S. federal courts have
spoken of a time "when operations against al Qaeda fighters end, or the
operational capacity of al Qaeda is effectively destroyed,, 94 counterterrorism
does not involve cease-fires, peaceful settlements, or armistices. The notions
of "cessation of active hostilities" and "general close of military operations"
thus prove difficult to apply and can lead to the conclusion that the conflict
with terrorist groups will continue ad infinitum. As one Bush administration
official explained, terrorist attacks such as "the Bali bombing, terrorist
attacks in the Philippines, Kuwait, and elsewhere-only underscore the fact
that this conflict remains ongoing and will continue for the foreseeable
future. 95 Traditional notions of repatriation at the end of hostilities may
offer helpful guidance in a geographically confined conflict with a non-state
actor or terrorist group, such as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka,9 6 but the
diffuse geographic nature of most conflicts with terrorist groups generally
makes traditional temporal concepts unlikely to apply effectively to such
conflicts.
93 Carrie Vance, A War to Be Won, to Be Won, OPEDNEWS.COM (May 27, 2010), http://www.o
pednews.com/articles/A-War-to-Be-Won-to-be-Wo-by-carrie-vance- 100524-408.html (including
a statement from Seth Jones, co-author of the July 2008 RAND report: "All terrorist groups end,
but terrorism, like crime, never ends."). See also SETH G. JONES & MARTIN C. LIBICKI, How
TERRORIST GROUPS END: LESSONS FOR COUNTERING AL QA'IDA, at xvii (2008), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RANDMG741-1.pdf (describing the ending of
terrorist groups and the ways the U.S. government should modify its counterterrorism strategy).
94 Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
95 Anthony Dworkin, Law and the Campaign Against Terrorism: The View From the
Pentagon, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT (Dec. 16, 2002), http://www.crimesofwar.org/print/onnew
s/pentagon-print.html.
96 Waxman, supra note 88, at 452-53 ("[A] particular organization [may be] sufficiently
coherent and could eventually be defeated in some meaningful sense (or its military capacity
sufficiently degraded to declare its defeat).").
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Beyond that, although the law of neutrality's fundamental principles and
goals are clear, the nature of the current conflict confounds attempts to use
the belligerency-neutrality framework effectively. First, terrorist groups are
non-state entities, ranging from highly organized groups to amorphous
groups of persons with similar aims and tactics. With the exception of
Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, and perhaps a few other
groups, most terrorist groups-and al Qaeda in particular-do not have
territory that can constitute belligerent territory or be distinguished from
neutral territory. As one scholar has explained:
[A]I Qaeda is an armed Sunni Islamist organization... seeking
to eliminate foreign influence in Muslim countries. Though its
exact organization is shrouded in secrecy, most analysts
describe it as comprising numerous independent and
collaborative cells operating across multiple countries. As
such, al Qaeda is not an entity temporally or geographically
tied to the prior defacto government of Afghanistan, but rather
an independent force engaged in a private war.97
Applying the concept of neutrality to these situations could lead to perverse
results where targets within the states combating terrorists are legitimate
military objectives-because those states are belligerents in the conflict
against terrorist groups-but targets within states where terrorists may find
safe haven, plan attacks, or transit through are not lawful objectives-
because the states in those situations are likely not belligerents themselves so
their territory is not belligerent territory. Indeed, with the exception of some
state sponsors of terrorism, few countries choose to side with a terrorist
organization, whether explicitly or implicitly.
Comparing the approach of U.S. courts today to that of U.S. courts
addressing issues in wars past highlights the difference between today's
conflict between states and terrorist groups, and previous wars between and
97 Murphy, supra note 19, at 1135 (citing LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL-
QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11, at 245 (2006)); The Global Reach of Al-Qaeda, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. On Int'l Operations and Terrorism of the S. Comm. On Foreign
Relations, 107th Cong. 7 (2001) (statement of Thomas Wilshere, Deputy Section Chief,
International Terrorism Operational Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation); The Global
Reach of Al-Qaeda, Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Int'l Operations and Terrorism of the
S. Comm. On Foreign Relations, 107th Cong. 21 (2001) (statement of Michele Flournoy,
Senior Advisor, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies). See generally JANE CORBIN, AL-QAEDA: IN SEARCH OF THE TERROR NETWORK THAT
THREATENS THE WORLD (2003) (examining the roots and post-9/11 activities and development
of al Qaeda); AL QAEDA Now: UNDERSTANDING TODAY'S TERRORISTS (Karen J. Greenberg
ed., 2005) (describing al Qaeda, in some ways, as a growing and changing ideological
movement).
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among multiple sovereign states, such as World War I and World War II.
Thus, a 1942 decision upholding the lawfulness of an order evacuating
Japanese-Americans to a military area stated plainly:
The field of military operation is not confined to the scene of
actual physical combat. Our cities and transportation systems,
our coastline, our harbors, and even our agricultural areas are
all vitally important in the all-out war effort in which our
country must engage if our form of government is to survive. 9
Similarly, the U.S. entrance into World War I brought "the port of New York
within the field of active [military] operations." 99 In both cases, the U.S. was
a belligerent in an international armed conflict; the law of neutrality
mandates that U.S. territory was part of the battlefield or combat zone. 00
Whereas the law of neutrality applied clearly and directly to the international
armed conflict between the U.S. and Japan and the U.S. and Germany and
Italy, as discussed above, the current conflict lies outside the framework of
the law of neutrality.
The reluctance of U.S. courts to fit the territory of the United States-
itself clearly engaged in the conflict against al Qaeda-within the zone of
combat seems a clear recognition that the traditional concepts of
belligerency, neutrality and territory may fall short in searching for the
parameters of the zone of combat in today's conflicts. In fact, U.S. practice
is the clearest example, perhaps, of how the legal conception of today's
conflicts with terrorist groups differs from that of conflicts in the past:
whereas U.S. territory was considered part of the theater of war in World
War I or World War II, case law and the general practice of employing law
enforcement measures within the U.S. suggest the opposite is true today.
Second, the United Nations Charter framework and the role of the United
Nations in combating terrorism raise substantial questions about the
relevance of neutrality in this particular conflict. U.N. member states are
bound to accept and implement Security Council decisions and "are required
98 Ex Parte Lincoln Seiichi Kanai, 46 F. Supp. 286, 288 (E.D. Wis. 1942).
99 United States ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald, 265 F. 754, 763 (E.D.N.Y. 1920). Note,
however, that in resolving claims for destruction of trees on a plantation in the Philippines
during World War I1, the U.S. Court of Claims found that the plantation was not part of the
combat zone at the time of the destruction because it was more than fifty miles from where the
fighting was at that time. The court defined the combat zone in a narrow way-perhaps
specifically for its purposes in that case-as "that part of a theater of operations in which the
active operations of the combat units are conducted. Specifically, the area occupied by the
field armies, between the front line and the forward boundary of the communications zone."
Baras Plantation Co. v. United States, 123 CT. CL. 150, 154 (1952).
100 See discussion supra Part IA (examining the law of neutrality).
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to give the UN every assistance in any action it takes, and refrain from giving
assistance to any state against which the UN is taking preventive or
enforcement action."'10 ' The impact of U.N. Security Council involvement in
a conflict or other situation may well be that no country can sit on the side
and remain neutral. 10 2 In essence, "when measures of collective security are
carried out by the UN in conformity with the Charter, Member States must
help one side (the UN force) and refrain from aiding and abetting the other
(the aggressor State)."'0 3 Although the Security Council has not imposed
measures of collective security in the present conflict between the U.S. and
al Qaeda, it has indeed entered the fray. Acting under Chapter VII authority
in Resolution 1373, the Security Council decided that
all States shall: (a) Refrain from providing any form of support,
active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist
acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of
terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to
terrorists; [and] (b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the
commission of terrorist acts .. .
This resolution does not specifically authorize the use of force against
terrorist groups or to prevent terrorist attacks, but definitively places all
member states in opposition to terrorist groups, leaving no room for a state to
be "neutral."
As a result, the entire concept of neutrality is problematic in this
context-but yet it seems hard to imagine that the absence of declaratively
neutral states means that no territory is inviolable in counterterrorism and
military operations against terrorists. One certainly might argue that any
country using military force against terrorists constitutes a belligerent in this
type of conflict. Similarly, one could argue that any state acting in concert
with or directly supporting terrorist groups on its territory could become a
101 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 5; U.K. MANUAL, supra note 17, para. 1.42.2.
102 See Astley & Schmitt, supra note 24, at 147 ("Consider the implications if this approach
is valid. In the absence of neutrality, trade restrictions beyond contraband would apply. Also,
since by definition there would be no neutral waters, target-State warships could no longer
escape attack by entering the territorial sea of a neutral. Further, neutrals have an obligation
to intern belligerent military personnel who come into their hands during a conflict and to
police its territory, ensuring that belligerents do not conduct operations or seek sanctuary
therein. However, if obligated to support UN-authorized operations, an avowed neutral state
would be required to capture and intern military personnel of the declared aggressor, while
immediately returning those supporting the UN operation. Moreover, the world community
would expect the 'neutral' to preclude the aggressor from operating in or entering its territory,
but to allow UN-authorized forces to operate there.").
103 DINSTEIN, supra note 20, at 164.
'04 S.C. Res. 1373, 2(a)-(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
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belligerent state as well. But what about states where terrorists operate or
find safe haven without state support or even in direct opposition to state
policy? Or state sponsors of terrorist groups operating in another state's
territory? If the territory of any state where a terrorist group operates or a
terrorist is found were to become belligerent territory even against its will,
then state sovereignty is simply eliminated. It is thus difficult to translate
neutrality law's framework into the murky world of today's conflicts, non-
state actors, and dispersed terrorist groups.
IV. INTO THE FUTURE: FINDING A MIDDLE GROUND
The ramifications of including areas within the zone of combat, such as
the accompanying authority to use lethal force as a first resort, raise a variety
of policy considerations. The two primary considerations weigh directly
against each other and perhaps, as a result, lend credence to the need for a
middle ground in defining the zone of combat. First, some argue that
creating geographic limits to the battlefield has the problematic effect of
granting terrorists a safe haven. For example, a member of al Qaeda can be a
legitimate target as a result of continuous participation in hostilities, thus
losing any immunity from attack he might have had by dint of being a
civilian. 0 5 If the zone of combat is limited geographically to certain areas,
then this member of al Qaeda can avoid being targeted-and thus regain
civilian immunity, in essence-simply by crossing an international border
even while remaining active in a terrorist organization engaged in a conflict
with the U.S. 10 6  Geographic limits designed to curtail the use of
governmental military force thus effectively grant terrorists a safe haven and
extend the conflict by enabling them to regroup and continue their attacks.
Alternatively, others argue that the lack of geographic limitations on the
zone of combat has grave consequences, both locally and globally. In
particular, "[t]he implications of allowing the use of armed force to capture
or kill enemies outside a country's own territory, and outside a theater of
traditional armed conflict, may include spiraling violence, the erosion of
105 Under LOAC, civilians are immune from attack unless, and for such time as, they
directly participate in hostilities. AP I, supra note 18, art. 51(3). According to the ICRC 2009
Interpretative Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities, civilians undertaking a
"continuous combat function" lose their immunity from attack at all times while so engaged.
Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under
International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT'L REV. RED CRoss 872, 995 (2008), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-documents.pdf.
1 6 Lewis, Rise of the Drones 1I, supra note 92. While LOAC would apply to any targeting
or use of force against such individual, the argument is that something akin to the law of




territorial sovereignty, and a weakening of international cooperation., 10 7 Use
of military force to target a person inside the territory of another state
without its consent inherently violates that state's sovereignty. A conception
of the battlefield enabling regular incursions into another state's territory
will, over time, have the effect of weakening the importance of state
sovereignty as a defining part of the international legal order. It also
increases the likelihood of violence on a more regular and more widespread
basis, as more and more locations fall within the arena of military operations.
With these tensions as a backdrop, one can look to LOAC to derive a
framework or set of parameters. Such factors can be drawn from LOAC
itself-from the general principles at the heart of LOAC and from the way
we understand whether there is an armed conflict in existence that triggers
LOAC.
A. Seeking Guidance from LOAC's General Principles
LOAC is a living body of law rather than a set of static concepts,
repeatedly adapting to uncertainties and changing circumstances. As Jean
Pictet wrote in 1985:
The international Conventions contain a multitude of rules
which specify the obligations of states in very precise terms,
but this is not the whole story. Behind these rules are a number
of principles which inspire the entire substance of the
documents.... They serve in a sense as the bone structure in a
living body, providing guidelines in unforeseen cases and
constituting a complete summary of the whole, easy to
understand and indispensable for the purposes of
dissemination.
10 8
When unforeseen situations have demanded new answers, LOAC's basic
principles have guided interpretations and helped find solutions to preserve
and protect the law's core values.
The Geneva Conventions, and the laws of war for centuries before that,
are based on four key principles: distinction, proportionality, military
107 Blum & Heymann, supra note 53, at 163.
108 JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 59
(1985). See also Murphy, supra note 19, at 1106 ("[B]uilt into the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and their Additional Protocols are the means for taking account of areas that are not addressed
explicitly or in detail. Rather than trying to exploit such gray areas in the law, lawyers should
seek to inject the dictates of humanity into them in a manner that best reconciles the
competing interests during armed conflict of both governments and persons who are at risk.").
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necessity, and humanity.1 °9 The principle of distinction requires all parties in
a conflict to distinguish between those who are fighting and those who are
not and only target the former when launching attacks. 10 The principle of
proportionality seeks to balance military goals with protection of civilians,
prohibiting attacks when the expected civilian casualties will be excessive
compared to the anticipated military advantage.'1 ' Military necessity
recognizes that the goal of war is the complete submission of the enemy as
quickly as possible and allows any force necessary to achieve that goal as
long as not forbidden by the law. 1 2 Finally, humanity aims to minimize
suffering in armed conflict; the infliction of suffering not necessary for
legitimate military purposes is therefore forbidden.
For the purposes of this analysis, military necessity and humanity are the
two key principles that can help provide guidance in delineating the zone of
combat. Military necessity naturally suggests a broad view of the zone of
combat in order to offer the most comprehensive opportunity to defeat the
enemy effectively. In essence,
[t]he appeal [of invoking armed conflict] is obvious: the IHL
applicable in armed conflict arguably has more permissive
rules for killing than does human rights law or a State's
domestic law, and generally provides immunity to State armed
forces. Because the law of armed conflict has fewer due
process safeguards, States also see a benefit to avoiding
109 U.S. Dep't of the Army, Field Manual 27-10: The Law of Land Warfare, app. A-1
(1956), available at http://www.aschq.army.mil/supportingdocs/FM2710.pdf.
110 AP I, supra note 18, art. 48, sets forth what is known as the "basic rule": "In order to
ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to
the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations
only against military objectives." See also AP II, supra note 18, art. 13 (emphasizing the
principle of distinction in non-international armed conflict: "Protection of the civilian
population. 1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection
against the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection, the
following rules shall be observed in all circumstances. 2. The civilian population as such, as
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited. 3.
Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this part, unless and for such time as they take
a direct part in hostilities.").
111 AP I, supra note 18, art. 51(5)(b) ("Among others, the following types of attacks are to
be considered as indiscriminate: ... an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.").
See also AP I, supra note 18, art. 57(2)(a)(iii)-(b) (requiring commanders to refrain from or
cancel an attack if the expected loss of civilian life would be excessive in relation to the
anticipated military advantage).
112 U.S. Dep't of the Army, supra note 109, para. 3(a).
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compliance with the more onerous requirements for capture,
arrest, detention or extradition of an alleged terrorist in another
State.... [Finally,] labeling a situation as an armed conflict
might also serve to expand executive power both as a matter of
domestic law and in terms of public support.13
At first glance, the principle of humanity seems to support a broad view of
the zone of combat as well. The Commentary to the Fourth Geneva
Convention emphasizes that the drafters sought to ensure the widest possible
field of application for LOAC's protective goals. First, the Commentary
explains that the phrase " 'in the hands of is used in an extremely general
sense. ' '114 In particular, Part I of the Fourth Geneva Convention, entitled
"General Protection of Populations Against Certain Consequences of War,"
has a broad application, covering "the whole of the populations of the
countries in conflict. ,,.1" In the past, this goal of maximizing protection
has been a driving force facilitating interpretations of complicated questions
regarding protected persons or other issues. For example, the ICTY's
approach in Tadic and other cases, basing protected person status on
allegiance rather than nationality, fulfills LOAC's general need for broad
applicability across territory, time, and categories of persons."
6
113 Alston, supra note 81, para. 47.
114 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 39, at 47. The Commentary continues, explaining:
It is not merely a question of being in enemy hands directly, as a prisoner is.
The mere fact of being in the territory of a Party to the conflict or in occupied
territory implies that one is in the power or 'hands' of the Occupying Power.
It is possible that this power will never actually be exercised over the
protected person: very likely an inhabitant of an occupied territory will never
have anything to do with the Occupying Power or its organizations. In other
words, the expression 'in the hands of' need not necessarily be understood in
the physical sense; it simply means that the person is in territory which is
under the control of the Power in question.
Id.
115 Id. at 118 ("In former times the need to protect the civilian population in wartime was not
felt to the same degree as since the more recent wars. Military operations nowadays-
particularly bombing from the air-threaten the whole population. Consequently the
provisions in Part II are as general and extensive in scope as possible .... The provisions in
Part II therefore apply not only to protected persons, i.e. to enemy or other aliens and to
neutrals, as defined in Article 4 but also to the belligerents' own nationals; it is that which
makes these provisions exceptional in character: the mere fact of a person residing in a
territory belonging to or occupied by a party to the conflict, is sufficient to make Part II of the
Convention applicable to him.").
116 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 166 (July 15,
1999).
[I]n modem inter-ethnic armed conflicts .... the requirement of nationality is
even less adequate to define protected persons. In such conflicts, not only the
text and the drafting history of the Convention but also, and more
importantly, the Convention's object and purpose suggest that allegiance to a
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This goal may not work as effectively, however, when correlated to
conflicts with terrorist groups. Simply put, taking a broad view of the time
and space dimensions in the war against terrorist groups could-with little
imagination-lead one to conclude that a large portion of the world falls
within the zone of combat, by dint of terrorist groups having a presence in
many countries and terrorist attacks taking place in many countries. While
this approach would, theoretically, mean that large numbers of persons might
benefit from the rights and protections of LOAC, it also means that large
swaths of the globe would fall within the use of force as first resort authority
that LOAC grants to belligerents. Thus, the principle of humanity more
rationally supports a narrow view of the zone of combat's parameters, one
that seeks to protect the most people by keeping conflict, and the battlefield,
away from their countries altogether. Because the risk of mistake increases
dramatically as we move farther away from the conventional battlefield,
humanity and its accompanying limitations on the use of force are ever more
critical. This result-broad based on military necessity and narrow based on
humanity-mirrors in some ways LOAC's essential and inherent balancing
of military necessity and humanity. Nonetheless, even though resort to the
general principles of LOAC and the object and purpose of the law can often
be a useful tool for resolving complicated or unforeseen issues, here it leaves
us with lingering uncertainties regarding how best to fulfill those goals.
B. Factors From LOAC's Armed Conflict Trigger
As explained above, this Article does not address the much-debated
question whether the conflict with al Qaeda constitutes an armed conflict as
understood within the framework of the Geneva Conventions and LOAC.
However, a number of the factors relevant to analyzing whether any conflict
situation meets the threshold of LOAC application can be useful here in
developing a paradigm for framing the battlefield in the "war on terror."
Determining whether violence between states, between a state and a non-
state actor, or between two or more non-state actors rises to the level of an
armed conflict is a foundational analytical step for LOAC, which only
applies during armed conflict. The most common and oft-cited
contemporary definition of armed conflict is from the Tadic case: an armed
conflict exists whenever "there is a resort to armed force between States or
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized
Party to the conflict and, correspondingly, control by this Party over persons
in a given territory, may be regarded as the crucial test.
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armed groups or between such groups within a State."'"17 According to the
Commentary, recognizing the existence of international armed conflict in
accordance with Common Article 2 is straightforward. "Any difference
arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members of the
armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if
one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war."'"18 The length of the
hostilities or the number of casualties does not impact the characterization as
armed conflict." 19 For this reason, analysis and interpretation of Common
Article 2 will not be particularly useful here. Rather, this section draws
factors and other relevant insights from LOAC's approach to non-
international conflict and Common Article 3.
The parameters of Common Article 3 conflicts can be harder to identify
concretely than those of Common Article 2 conflicts; according to the
Commentary, no specific test for determining the applicability of Common
Article 3 exists. Rather, the goal is to interpret Common Article 3 broadly 20
based on a number of indicative-but not dispositive-factors regarding the
nature and behavior of both state and non-state parties. For example, the
state's response is a critical component, in particular whether it employs its
regular armed forces in combating the non-state actor. 121 Another key factor
is the intensity of the hostilities and whether it rises above the level of riots
and internal disturbances.' 22 Finally, the Commentary considers the non-
state actor's authority, organization, and territorial connections. 23
The United States, like selected other countries, views itself as operating
within an armed conflict paradigm in combating terrorism. 124 Much of the
117 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 90 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995).
118 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 39, at 20.
119 Id.
120 Id. ("Does this mean Article 3 is not applicable in cases where armed strife breaks out in
a country, but does not fulfill any of [the suggested criteria]? We do not subscribe to this
view. We think, on the contrary, that the scope of the application of the article must be as
wide as possible.").
121 LEWIS ETAL., supra note 15, at 16-17.
122 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Judgment, para. 562 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, para.
84 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005).
123 See PICTET, supra note 108, at 48 (noting that key factors include whether the non-state
actor (1) has an organized military force; (2) has an authority responsible for its acts; (3) acts
within a determinate territory; and (4) acts as a de facto governing entity such that its armed
forces act are prepared to obey the laws of war).
124 Koh, supra note 16. France recently declared that it is "at war with al-Qaida," in
response to the murder of a French aid worker. Elaine Ganley, France Declares War Against
al-Qaida, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 27, 2010. See also Waxman, supra note 88, at 445 ("If one
believes that the law of armed conflict may be an appropriate framework for regulating
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continuing debate centers on the nature of this conflict rather than on
whether it exists at all. Some argue that this conflict falls outside this
framework altogether, 2 5 leaving us with a conflict unregulated by the laws
of war, a problematic conclusion, but an armed conflict nonetheless.
Alternatively, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
conflict with al Qaeda is a non-international armed conflict governed by
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.'26 Finally, some scholars
point to a new category of conflict, so-called "transnational armed
conflict,' '127 which involves the "transnational characteristics of international
armed conflict, but the military operational characteristics of
nonintemational armed conflicts (because of the state versus nonstate nature
of the operations).' 28  However contentious this debate, it rests on the
fundamental presumption that the U.S. is engaged in some type of armed
conflict. Thus, several factors identified above from traditional LOAC
analyses regarding non-international armed conflict can prove helpful to the
instant analysis: the nature of the hostilities, the government response, and
the territorial connections of the non-state actor or terrorist group.
1. What are Hostilities?
Traditionally, LOAC looks to the intensity of the hostilities to determine
whether violence in a particular area or situation has passed the threshold
necessary to constitute a non-international armed conflict. For the purposes
of this article, it will be helpful to examine the types of violence, attacks and
acts that are normally considered to fall within the category of hostilities in
the framework of LOAC. Analogizing terrorist acts and activities to
hostilities can be a useful starting point in identifying the parameters of the
counterterrorism operations-including capture and detention of or use of lethal force against
enemy terrorist agents-a key question then becomes the substantive scope of that authority:
against which individuals and under what circumstances does it apply, and what does it permit
a state to do against them?").
125 Memorandum from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez for President George W.
Bush, Decision re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict
with al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD
To ABU GHRAIB 118-19 (Karen Greenberg & Joshua Dratel eds., 2005).
126 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that "non-international" does not
necessarily only connote internal conflicts, but refers to all conflicts that do not fit within the
parameters of state-to-state conflict in Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions).
127 See Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to
Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 295 (2007)
(arguing for recognition of a hybrid category of armed conflict called "transnational armed
conflict").
128 Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Untying the Gordian Knot: A Proposal for




zone of combat. As a general rule, classical definitions of armed conflict and
hostilities exclude "civil unrest or terrorist activities.,0'29 But our analysis
should not stop there, because just as traditional conceptions of armed
conflict may not be effective in analyzing the conflict with al Qaeda, so
classical understandings of hostilities may not hold all the answers.
First, Article 49 of Additional Protocol I defines an attack as an "[act] of
violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.' 130 Attack
thus "means 'combat action' ,,131 and refers to "physical force. 132  The
Commentary further defines hostile acts as "acts which by their nature and
purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of
the armed forces" and explains that the term " 'hostilities' covers not only
the time that [a] civilian actually makes use of a weapon, but also, for
example,... situations in which he undertakes hostile acts without using a
weapon."' 133 Most terrorist acts fall within one or more of these definitions
with little trouble.
A next step in this analysis is to incorporate information about the types
of acts that constitute hostilities for the purposes of analyzing the intensity of
hostilities. ICTY cases have involved a wide range of types of hostilities and
the Tribunal has concomitantly pointed to a number of considerations in
making determinations about intensity. Among those considerations,
particularly relevant ones for this analysis include the number of civilian
casualties, the extent of material destruction and the types of weapons
used. 134 By those measures, many terrorist attacks could fall within a general
notion of hostilities. Many attacks over the past decade have caused
hundreds-even thousands in the case of 9/ 1--of civilian deaths, have
wrought substantial material destruction, and have used sophisticated
explosives or coordinated attacks with automatic weapons, such as in
Mumbai. One definition of "attack" used at the ICTY is "incidents in which
firearms, hand-grenades, and other explosive devices were used against
129 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 184 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Nov. 16, 1998). See also COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE, supra note 42, at 271; Reservation by the United Kingdom to art. 1(4) and art. 96(3)
of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (declaring that
"'armed conflict' of itself and in its context denotes a situation of a kind which is not
constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes including acts of terrorism whether
concerted or in isolation").
130 AP I, supra note 18, art. 49(1).
'31 PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 2, para. 1880.
132 MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 289 (1982).
133 PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 2, paras. 1942-43 (referring to the notion of direct
participation in hostilities).
134 Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, para. 49 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008).
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civilians" and enemy forces.135 In addition, the target of particular attacks
can be determinative-attacks on a military target will often be more likely
to constitute hostilities that fall within the category of armed conflict. 136 One
might therefore distinguish the attack on the U.S.S. Cole-a military target-
from an attack on a civilian vessel or other civilian target in assessing how
each might constitute hostilities within a zone of combat.
Admittedly, the ordinary use of the term "hostilities" within LOAC and
international criminal jurisprudence does not necessarily translate well to a
world in which terrorists attack in diverse geographic locations and seek safe
haven in multiple remote locations around the world. But just as there is an
emerging "recognition ... that [LOAC] principles must. . . 'migrate' to the
realm of transnational armed conflicts, 1 37 so perhaps the notion of hostilities
may begin to encompass certain terrorist acts, at least for limited analytical
purposes. In the interim, the characterization and description of hostilities
can be useful in understanding how different types of terrorist attacks can
impact identification of the zone of combat.
2. Government Response
The nature of the government response is the most adaptable of these
three factors to a conflict with terrorist groups. In assessing whether a non-
international armed conflict exists, how the government responds to
provocation or violence is one way courts have traditionally understood a
distinction between riots or internal disturbances and armed conflict. The
use of law enforcement personnel is usually a sign that the government views
the situation as one falling within the former arena and not within the overall
framework of armed conflict. In contrast, armed conflict often requires the
government "to have recourse to the regular military forces" to combat the
threats or challenges it faces.138 The most-oft cited example of this factor is
the decision of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the La
Tablada case. In analyzing whether LOAC applied to an attack on an
Argentine military barracks and the thirty-hour firefight that ensued, the
135 Id. para. 91. One expert used this definition in presenting information about Kosovo
Liberation Army attacks on Serbian forces.
136 See, e.g., Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. 271, para. 155 (1997) (finding that the military nature of the
target was a major factor in concluding that the thirty-hour firefight constituted hostilities that
rose above the threshold of armed conflict).
137 Corn, supra note 54, at 1352.
138 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 39, at 35.
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Commission found that the distinctly military nature of the government's
response was persuasive, if not determinative. 1
39
In the context of the current conflict, many see the U.S. government's
decision to use military force "to combat terrorism... as one important
indication of the existence of an armed conflict., 140 Given that the U.S. and
other governments have a range of tools at their disposal to combat
terrorists-military force, law enforcement options, etc.-the nature of the
government response can also be a relevant factor in identifying the
parameters of the zone of combat. One complex analysis of how the
government's response impacts the nature-and thus location-of the
conflict addresses how the government chooses to categorize and
characterize the enemy for purposes of targeting and other uses of force.
Rules of engagement authorizing targeting based on status, and thus
specifically based on the concept of military objective, suggest the existence
of an armed conflict; rules of engagement based on conduct would suggest
otherwise. 41  Applying this type of analysis to the location of a conflict
rather than the existence of a conflict, for example, shows how the
government's response can be a useful factor in identifying the parameters of
the zone of combat.
3. Territory
Although Common Article 3 includes no requirement that a non-state
party control or occupy a specific territorial area, territory can play a role in
the analysis of whether a particular situation qualifies as an armed conflict.
Among the criteria the Commentary mentions are: the non-state actor is
"acting within a determinate territory," or "the insurgent civil authority
exercises defacto authority over persons within a determinate portion of the
national territory."' 142 As with other factors in the Commentary, these criteria
are merely considerations that may play a role in assessing the nature of a
conflict under Common Article 3. In contrast, Additional Protocol II only
applies to conflicts in which "dissident armed forces or other organized
139 Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L/V/lI.95, doc. 7 rev. 271, para. 155 (1997) ("The officer in charge of the La
Tablada base sought, as was his duty, to repulse the attackers, and President Alfonsin,
exercising his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, ordered
that military action be taken to recapture the base and subdue the attackers.").
140 Paulus & Vashakmadze, supra note 15, at 116.
141 See Corn & Jensen, supra note 128, at 818, 826 ("[Status-based rules of engagement]
permit the application of destructive combat power based solely on the determination that the
anticipated object of attack is associated with a group or entity that has been 'declared hostile'
by national authority.").
42 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 39, at 35-36.
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groups.. . , under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of
[the] territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations. '' 143 Whether territorial control is required or merely considered,
the link between the non-state forces and some territory is a relevant factor in
analyzing the nature of the conflict.
But the notion of territory and territorial control or administration does
not translate effectively to most conflicts with terrorist groups. Terrorist
groups generally do not seek to control territory, but rather use particular
areas as safe havens, training grounds, or launching pads for attacks. One
remote area is often as good as another in many ways. Nonetheless,
territorial concepts and links can be a relevant factor in creating a paradigm
for understanding the zone of combat, albeit in a more creative way. Those
who propound a "global battlefield theory" use territory as a factor by
looking at where terrorists are presently located; that is, according to this
theory, anywhere one finds a designated terrorist would constitute part of the
battlefield. Without going so far, territory can also be useful in a more
intermediate approach to defining the zone of combat. Terrorist groups may
not occupy or administer territory, but they have a more concrete footprint in
certain areas, such as where they find safe haven, where they establish
training camps, and if relevant, where they launch repeated attacks. These
locations naturally have a stronger connection to the ongoing conflict than
other areas where no attacks have taken place or where an identifiable
terrorist is located but not engaged in any activity. Another way of looking
at this factor is to consider that as an al Qaeda member's connection,
geographic or otherwise, to the areas of traditional combat operations grows
more attenuated, the presumption of deadly force authority weakens. As
such, perhaps, this interpretation of territory can be a helpful factor in
defining the geographic parameters of the zone of combat. Similarly, we can
add temporal considerations as well, differentiating between time periods
when a terrorist group is using certain territorial areas as described above,
and when it, perhaps, vacates a safe haven or training camp area.
V. DEFINING THE ZONE OF COMBAT
Notwithstanding the complicated nature of the conflict between the U.S.
and al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups, and the resulting confusion in
trying to define the space where that conflict is taking place, identifying the
parameters of the zone of combat is a critical task. At the same time that
many debate whether a state can even be engaged in an armed conflict with a
terrorist group, a critically important question with ramifications for
143 AP II, supra note 18, art. 1; U.K. MANUAL, supra note 17, para. 3.7.
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generations to come, the U.S. has declared that it indeed is in such an armed
conflict and is operating accordingly. Analyzing how we can understand the
parameters of the zone of combat and assessing relevant factors for doing so
must become part of the debate and discussion surrounding the appropriate
response to and manner of combating terrorism.
This Article demonstrates that traditional conceptions of belligerency and
neutrality are not designed to address the complex spatial and temporal
nature of terrorist attacks and states responses. Nor can human rights law or
domestic criminal law, which are both legal regimes of general applicability,
offer a useful means for defining where a state can conduct military
operations against terrorist groups. LOAC, in contrast, provides a
framework not only for when it applies, but where and for how long. By
using this framework and analogizing relevant factors and considerations to
the conflict with al Qaeda, we can identify factors that can help define the
zone of combat.
First, some terrorist attacks and activities fall closer to the traditional
conception of hostilities as understood within LOAC. Areas where these
types of attacks occur naturally have a stronger link to a battlefield. In
addition, when such attacks or activities occur regularly or over a defined
time period, we can more clearly define the temporal parameters of the zone
of combat as well.
Second, in declaring that it is "at war with terrorists," a state may
envision the whole world as a battlefield. But the state's actual conduct in
response to the threat posed offers a more accurate lens through which to
view the battlefield. Areas where the state uses military force, particularly
multiple facets of military power, on a regular or recurring basis, should fall
within the zone of combat. In contrast, those areas where the state chooses
diplomatic or law enforcement measures, or relies on such efforts by another
state, do not demonstrate the characteristics of the battlefield. This same
analysis holds true for the temporal parameters as well. Applying this type
of analysis in a simplistic manner does indeed leave room for abuse by states
that might overuse military power merely to try to squeeze otherwise non-
battlefield areas within the zone of combat. While this is certainly a
consideration, government response is only one factor to take into account in
assessing the parameters of the zone of combat and both the nature of the
international community and the great expense, both human and material, of
applying military might where not necessary will likely weigh against any
such abuse.
The third factor-territory-requires the most creative application.
Terrorist groups do not use or connect to territory in the same manner as
either states or non-state actors seeking to gain power or independence.
Conflicts against terrorist groups, as a result, do not follow the boundaries on
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a map or the dictates of state sovereignty or international legal niceties. But
territory can be a contributing factor to a paradigm defining the zone of
combat nonetheless. Looking at territory from a new angle, we can see that
terrorists use certain areas for safe havens and training camps and identify
certain areas as prime targets for repeated attacks. Those territorial areas
must therefore have a stronger connection to the zone of combat than others,
both geographically and temporally, because the way terrorists use particular
areas will naturally change over time.
Besides these factors drawn from the law of armed conflict, we can look
to judicial interpretations and policy considerations as well. Taken as a
whole, these analytical tools form a first step in the critical task of
identifying where and when a state can conduct operations within an armed
conflict framework, a necessary companion to the ongoing debate about
whether a state can conduct operations within such a framework.
